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ALEX B. LONG*

A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin
and the ADA's Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement in
Competitive Settings
Throughout its brief history, the full scope of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) has remained largely unsettled.
Federal courts routinely face the difficult task of attempting to
define the contours of a law with little case history and scarce
legislative guidance.' Questions concerning "What is a disability
under the ADA" consume the efforts of both the courts2 and
commentators. The underlying principles of promoting fairness
and access for the disabled are, however, almost universally
accepted.
When golfer Casey Martin challenged the Professional Golf
Association's (PGA) rule preventing golfers from riding in golf
carts during tournament play, he touched off a national debate
on the fundamental fairness of the PGA's rule.4 The case, Martin
* B.A. 1991, James Madison University; J.D. 1998, Marshall Wythe School of Law,
College of William & Mary; Associate, Steptoe & Johnson, Clarksburg, WV.
1 See 136 CONG. REc. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong).
2 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a covered disability under the ADA); Zatarin v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that infertility is not a disability
within the meaning of the ADA); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that infertile plaintiff stated a claim within the ADA's definition of disability).
3 See, e.g., Deborah K. Dallman, The Lay View of What "Disability" Means Must
Give Way to What Congress Says it Means: Infertility as a "Disability" Under the
Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371 (1996) (discussing
circuit split concerning whether infertility is a disability under the ADA).
4 See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998); John Garrity,
Taking One for the Team, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at 63; Jurek Martin,
Taking the Rulebook to Court, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at 20; Scott Mills,
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v. PGA Tour, Inc. ,' contained two important issues concerning
6
disability law. The first issue, and arguably the most important
aspect of the ruling-that the PGA was not a private club for
purposes of the ADA and hence not immune from its coverage 7-generated relatively little discussion among the public at
large. The second aspect-the court's conclusion that the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement mandated that the PGA
permit the disabled Martin to utilize a golf cart during tournament play 8-caught the attention of non-lawyers and non-golfers
alike. The Martin court's conclusion, requiring the PGA to accommodate Martin by allowing him to ride in a golf cart because
it would not alter the fundamental nature of the competition,
drew a sharp response.9 Golfing traditionalists howled at the
federal magistrate judge's decision,1 ° while the general public
found the requirement to be a fair and sensible solution.1 1 What
was lacking from the national debate, however, was a focus on
what role, if any, the ADA should have in competitive situations.
This Article focuses on the role the ADA should have in competitive situations. Additionally, it makes a simple point, but a
Ruling Gives Golfer A Free Ride, Not A Level Playing Field,

BULLETIN,

Feb. 24,

1998, at A7; Casey Martin's Ride, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 15, 1998, at G2.
5 994 F. Supp. 1242.
6 See Judge: PGA Tour is Place of Public Accommodation Ruling More Important
Than Trial's Outcome, Experts Say, Disability Law Compliance Bulletin, Feb. 12,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
7 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246-47.
8 See id. at 1247.
9 Id. at 1251.
10
In an editorial, the local newspaper in Augusta, Georgia, home of the famous
Masters Golf Tournament, argued that "[e]ven the most generous interpretation of
the ADA doesn't give judges the power to rewrite the rules of competitive sports."
Appeal Martin Ruling, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 23, 1998, at A4.
11 See Garrity, supra note 4, at 63 ("The Tour's obstinacy has cost it dearly in
public esteem."); Martin, supra note 4, at 20 (implying that public sympathy appears
much in Martin's corner); Casey Martin's Ride, supra note 4, at G2 ("Popular opinion is surely on the side of Casey Martin.").
Golf Digest's accounting of the case is particularly revealing:
The Hartford Courant called golfers "snobbish Neanderthals." The Seattle
Times decried the tour's "insensitivity, arrogance, and stupidity." The Toronto Star declared the "pig-headed" tour "the most elitist pro sports organization in existence." The typical tour player came off as stuffy, petty,
exclusionary, greedy and self-righteous. He also wore yellow plaid pants.
"A public-relations nightmare," veteran player Peter Jacobsen said.
"Ninety percent of people want to know why the tour is persecuting this
poor kid."
Dave Kindred, A Nightmare That Could Have Been Avoided, GOLF DIG., May 1998,
at 74.
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point that judges must address in future ADA cases involving
competitive situations: namely, that the ADA's reasonable accommodation standard does not fit as neatly into the public accommodation setting involving competitive behavior as it does
into the more traditional employment context. When the law attempts to introduce the abstract notion of "reasonable accommodation" into the laboratory setting of competition in places of
public accommodation, it raises serious questions about fundamental fairness and equal opportunity. As the first high profile
case to deal with the ADA in a competitive setting, Martin had
the opportunity to address the shortcomings of the statute in
such a setting and to help define the contours of what "reasonable accommodation" means in a situation that produces clear
winners and losers based on quantifiable performance. Although
the decision in Martin may have been correct on its facts, the
opinion failed to come to grips with a key principle inherent in
any situation where participants are placed in head-to-head competition: A special modification of the rules of the game for one
individual, however slight, may necessarily alter the level playing
field for all participants.
The Martin decision focused primarily on whether a specific
waiver of the PGA Tour's rule preventing players from riding in
golf carts constituted a "reasonable modification."12 The court
had to determine whether such an accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of PGA events. 3 The court failed,
however, to adequately address the potential consequences of
forcing a modification of governing rules in competitive settings.
As a result of this failure, the Martin decision has potential implications beyond simply the game of golf. It could apply to any
situation involving the ADA where one person's gain equals another's loss.
This Article uses the Martin decision, and similar decisions involving the ADA in competitive settings, to illustrate several
points. First, it illustrates how broad the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement actually is when it is placed in the
context of competitive situations. This is an issue that has ramifications not only for athletes, but students seeking to gain admission to schools based on standardized aptitude tests; law students
taking state bar examinations; or even potential employees who
12 Martin,
13 See id.

994 F. Supp. at 1246.
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are judged by some type of quantifiable criteria. The Martin decision also raises fundamental questions about the fairness of a
law that can mandate an alteration of the rules in competitive
settings.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the language
and purposes of the ADA and attempts to illustrate some of the
issues raised by the Martin decision. Specifically, Part I analyzes
typical employment situations involving the reasonable accommodation requirement in an effort to highlight how the ADA
views the concepts of "fairness" and "equality." This analysis
draws the rather unremarkable conclusion that, at least in the
employment setting, the reasonable accommodation requirement
is fair to all employees as it imposes no burden on the nondisabled.
Part II attempts to illustrate how, as one progresses farther
away from the employment setting and into more competitive
settings, the fundamental fairness of the reasonable accommodation standard is more easily susceptible to challenge. Specifically, in cases of standardized testing used for admission to
college, graduate school, law school, and admission to the bar,
the competitive nature of the settings demands greater caution
when granting special accommodations.
Part III addresses the line of cases most similar to Martin:
namely, cases involving eligibility rules for participation in athletic programs. These cases clearly illustrate how, if due concern
is not paid to the fundamental notion of competition, the reasonable accommodation requirement may go beyond simply placing
the disabled on the same footing as the able-bodied and may instead provide the disabled with a competitive advantage, thereby
fundamentally altering the nature of competition.
Finally, this Article addresses Casey Martin's situation. Martin
represents a special class at the furthest end of the spectrum from
the typical employer reasonable accommodation case. In professional golf, and in any professional sport, the essence or nature of
the activity is competition. When a governing authority is forced
to alter an existing rule in order to accommodate a disabled individual, the change may in some cases result in a fundamental alteration of the nature of the event. This mandatory change
potentially creates an unfair situation whereby a special allowance for one participant necessarily places other participants at a
competitive disadvantage, if applied in- this manner, the ADA
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ceases to be fair to all parties concerned. Although this Article
concludes that the result reached in Martin concerning the accommodation at issue was correct, the court's analysis failed to
adequately address this concern. Specifically, it failed to recognize that the nature of a professional golf event is distinctively
competitive, and that by introducing a new variable into the laboratory setting of competition, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, if applied incorrectly, could destroy the
fundamental fairness of competition.
This Article attempts to formulate an approach courts should
take in this special circumstance. In addition to conducting an
inquiry into the purposes of the governing rule and asking
whether a modification would frustrate its purpose, courts should
give special consideration to the degree of competition involved
in a particular program. By reluctantly expanding the ADA to
such operations in close situations courts will be able to prevent
the potential unfairness that may arise when modifications are
made to existing rules designed to level the playing field for all
participants.
I
THE

A.

ADA

IN THE WORKPLACE

Overview of the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Prior to the passage of the ADA, there was little to prevent
employers from discriminating against the disabled.1 4 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited discrimination against the disabled by programs receiving federal financial assistance,'1 5 but
the vast majority of private sector employees remained immune
from the law's proscription.1 6 The ADA requires employers and
private entities to make reasonable accommodations to existing
17
practices in order to allow full participation by the disabled.
Title I governs the employment setting.1 8 Championed by sup14 See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 26-28 (1990) [hereinafter A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE].
15 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
16 See A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 14, at 26-28.
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12182(b)(2)(ii) (1994). Instead of "reason-

able accommodation," Title III uses the term "reasonable modifications." See id.
Although not technically accurate, the two terms are used interchangeably for purposes of this Article.
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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porters in Congress as the "most comprehensive civil rights legislation our Nation has ever seen,"'" the ADA prohibits
discrimination against a qualified individual in nearly all facets of
the employment relationship because of the disability of such an
individual.2 °
It is clear from the legislative history of the ADA that one of
Congress' main concerns was how the law would affect the employment setting. Despite strong support for the measure,21
some members of Congress expressed concern that the law
would unduly burden smaller employers,2 2 unfairly impose punitive damages on employers, 23 and create an adversarial relationship between employers and employees based upon the law's
allegedly vague definition of what constitutes a "disability."2 4
Although Congress was clearly concerned about creating equal
opportunity in other settings, it was the employment area that
generated the most debate and garnered the most attention. This
focus on the ADA in the employment setting continues today
with the majority of case law developing in the employment
context.
B.

Purposes of the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to "assure equality of opportunity" for disabled individuals.26 On its face, the ADA is not
unique in the tapestry of employment discrimination law. The
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, however, helps
to separate the ADA from its counterparts, such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)27 and the Age Discrimi19 136 CONG. REC. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dole).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, Title I prohibits discrimination "in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." Id.
21 The Act passed the House of Representatives by a 337-28 vote and the Senate
by a 91-6 vote. See 136 CONG. REC. H4629 (daily ed. July 2, 1990); 136 CONG. REC.

S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
22 See A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 14, at 32-62.
23 See id.

24 See 136 CONG. REC. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong).
25 See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th
Cir. 1997).
26 136 CONG. REc. S9527-02 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994).
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nation in Employment Act (ADEA).2 s
As other commentators have noted, the reasonable accommodation concept functions to separate the ADA from traditional
anti-discrimination laws.2 9 Similar to laws which protect against
discrimination based on race, gender, or age, the ADA provides
"a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."3 Thus,
like its counterparts, the ADA prohibits discrimination because
of an illegitimate criterion-in this instance, disability.3 ' But as
Professors Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen have noted,
the ADA differs from these other statutes in one crucial respect:
Under Title VII and the ADEA, "plaintiffs can complain of discrimination against them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their favor; disabled individuals often can."3 2 An example
given by Professors Karlan and Rutherglen helps to illustrate this
point.
Suppose that one "essential function" of the job of sack handler is to carry fifty-pound sacks from the company loading
dock to a store room. If a male worker is physically disabled
by a back ailment, and thus unable to carry the sacks the full
distance, the company can be required to make the reasonable
accommodation of providing the worker with a dolly on which
to transport the sacks. By contrast, if a female worker cannot
lift the same heavy cartons hoisted by her male counterparts,
no accommodation is required and firing her because she cannot do the job as it then stands does not constitute impermissible sex discrimination.3 3
Thus, whereas in most employment discrimination laws, employers are forbidden to take into account a particular trait of an
employee, the ADA actually requires such consideration. 34 Failure to do so constitutes discrimination based on an individual's
disability.
In this sense, the reasonable accommodation functions like affirmative action, mandating that an employer or cov28

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).

29 See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination,and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1996).

3042 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
31 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (prohibiting discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(2) (prohibiting discrimination "because of [an] individual's age").
32 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 3.
33 Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
34 See id. at 9.
35 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
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ered entity provide special treatment to an individual based on a
particular trait.36
One need not choose a side in the affirmative action debate to
recognize that traditional race- and gender-based affirmative action programs raise issues of fundamental fairness. In contrast,
the reasonable accommodation requirement, at least in the employment context, is generally regarded as a rather uncontroversial affirmative action program. Few question the wisdom or
fairness of affording preferential treatment to an employee with
a disability in the workplace. From a purely practical standpoint,
the reasonable accommodation requirement makes sense: it
helps enable some of the estimated forty-three million individuals with disabilities seek gainful employment. 37 But given the reality of persistent discrimination in the workplace based on race
and gender, this same argument is easily made in support of
more traditional affirmative action programs, yet opponents of
such programs still remain resolute in their opposition. Thus,
there must be another factor which explains why disability-based
affirmative action is viewed as non-problematic. That factor,
quite obviously, is the perceived fairness of the reasonable accommodation requirement.
Although commentators have debated, and will continue to
debate, the meaning of such terms as "fairness" and "equality," 3 8
for purposes of this Article "fairness" means nothing more than a
situation in which one person is not disadvantaged by the treatment afforded a similarly-situated individual. This working definition excludes some situations which might be considered
"unfair" under a stricter definition of the term. For example, the
reasonable accommodation requirement could be considered
"unfair" in the sack-handling example above because the grantor
of the accommodation bestows preferential treatment to the disabled worker; however, as will be explained later, under the
working definition of "fairness," the special treatment is "fair."3 9
This working definition is employed in order to address those sit36 See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 14.
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994) (finding that 43 million Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities).
38

See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.

1122, 1143 n.68 (1998) (discussing different commentators' conceptions of the term
39

fl

raYtnan

39 See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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uations in which equal treatment is absolutely essential-namely,
competitive settings.
There are several explanations for the fundamental fairness of
the ADA in the workplace. The below examples illustrate how,
in the typical workplace, the reasonable accommodation requirement is fair to the parties involved.4"
1.

Nature of the Workplace

One factor which lessens the perception of any potential unfairness in the ADA is the simple nature of the workplace. Unlike a sporting event, the purpose of the workplace is not to
create a playing field on which co-workers compete with each
other. Admittedly, in some sense, all workers are in competition
with each other. Employers select employees for promotion and
salary increases based in part on their performance as compared
to other workers. Employers want "the best" employees for the
job, and "the best" naturally implies comparison. 4 ' But the main
requirement of any job is simply the ability to perform the job to
the satisfaction of the employer. Employees do not come to
work each day in order to beat their co-workers in the same
sense as professional football players do. Normally, an employee
is not required to somehow outperform his or her co-workers.
Thus, the nature or essence of the office and factory setting for
workers is one of production, not competition. Unlike a sporting
event where the participant's goal is to beat his or her competitors, the typical employee's goal is to produce a satisfactory work
product. When an employer makes a reasonable accommodation
for a disabled employee so that the disabled employee may perform the essential functions of his or her job, the employer has
done nothing to limit the ability of other employees to perform
their jobs in a satisfactory fashion.
This is not to suggest that the ADA creates no fairness
problems in the workplace. If an employer were to give such
special treatment based on race or gender, rather than disability,
many would not be so quick to dismiss the benefits that might
40

See infra notes 41-47.
41 Obviously, employers look to the skill level and experience of applicants and
employees in order to make hiring and layoff decisions. See Taxman v. Board of
Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (involving a decision to select one
employee for termination over an equally qualified employee on the basis of race).
In this sense, employees are in competition with each other.
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flow from outperforming one's co-workers.4 2 Instead, the perceived fairness problems are lessened in the disability setting,
and it is the nature of the workplace which accounts for this perception. As we shall see, the ADA begins to raise greater fairness concerns when the setting switches from the workplace to
other settings.
2.

The Reasonable Accommodation Requirement in Action

A second factor accounting for the overall fairness of the reasonable accommodation requirement in the workplace lies in the
purposes and functioning of this requirement. A slight alteration
of the facts in the prior example involving the male worker transporting sacks by utilizing a dolly illustrates this point. Imagine
that the disabled individual has a female co-worker who is capable of lifting the sacks without the assistance of a dolly.43 The
dolly provided to the disabled worker is clearly a gain; however,
the disabled worker's gain in no way disadvantages the female
worker. Although she undoubtedly would prefer to have a dolly
to help do her work, she is still able to perform the essential function of the job just as her disabled male counterpart now is. The
dolly merely serves to place the disabled worker on the same
footing as the non-disabled worker, or, in other words, it levels
the playing field. The disabled worker's gain is not the non-disabled worker's loss and no issues of unfairness are present.4 4
Assume further that the dolly enables the disabled worker to
lift more sacks than his counterpart during the course of a work
day. Theoretically, by virtue of being able to transport more
sacks per day than his counterpart, the accommodation might
place the disabled individual at an advantage when it came time
to promote one of the sack handlers. The supervisor will undoubtedly compare the performance of the workers and realize
that the disabled individual is performing more efficiently than
his counterpart. However, the nature of the workplace helps to
limit any potential unfairness in this situation. Promotion decisions are only infrequently based solely on quantifiable factors,
such as the number of sacks lifted, the amount of sales commis42 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (disallowing the
use of preferential protection against layoffs to minority employees).

43 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
4 See Zacharis, supra note 38. at 1143 n.68 and accompanying text (defining

fairness).
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sion, etc. Supervisors take into account numerous factors in their
promotion decisions, including an employee's interpersonal
skills, management experience, etc. Thus, the disabled employee's gain as a result of the accommodation does not automatically translate into a loss for his counterpart.
The situation becomes slightly more problematic when the
original facts are used, i.e., the female worker cannot lift the
sacks. If the disabled worker is allowed to use the dolly and, as a
result, is able to perform the job, but the female worker does not
receive such special treatment, and is thus unable to perform the
essential function of the job, this appears to raise a fairness issue.
The female worker will lose her job under this scenario, but the
disabled worker will not. The ADA's requirement that a disabled individual be "otherwise qualified" to perform the job
helps alleviate such fairness concerns. An "otherwise qualified"
individual is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual
and others."a Thus, in making the determination that the disabled worker is otherwise qualified, the ADA assumes that, but
for the individual's impairment, he would be able to perform the
essential functions of the sack handling position as it stands. The
reasonable accommodation requirement in this instance serves to
eliminate the barrier that separates the disabled from the nondisabled worker. The requirement attempts to place the disabled
worker on the same footing as other workers.46 If the disabled
employee is not able to transport the sacks due to his lack of
physical strength, even with the assistance of the dolly or some
other accommodation, he would not be entitled to the protection
of the ADA because he is not qualified for the position.4 7 The
female employee is unable to perform the essential function, not
because of any impairment, but because of lack of physical
strength. The ADA starts with the assumption that what separates a qualified individual with a disability from other employees is the individual's disability. The reasonable accommodation
45 See
46

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
See, e.g., D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217,
221 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the function of the reasonable accommodation requirement as to place disabled individuals on "equal footing" with the nondisabled).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (limiting protection against discrimination to "qualified individual[s]").
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requirement seeks only to overcome the individual's disability,
not social or genetic forces.4 8
Admittedly, the disabled individual in this scenario is receiving
an advantage his counterpart is not. In this sense, the reasonable
accommodation requirement does seem to provide an advantage
that could be deemed "unfair." The reasonable accommodation
requirement, however, simply serves to overcome the barrier
which separates the disabled individual from other employees
and places the disabled employee on the same level as other employees, regardless of gender or cultural forces. If the disabled
worker still cannot do the job due to gender or cultural forces, he
will lose his job. The individual's disability, however, in this instance is one additional limitation on his ability which the ADA
seeks to eliminate. Thus, the reasonable accommodation requirement tries to eliminate this barrier, yet, from then on, the
individual is forced to overcome any other limitations just as his
counterparts are. As such, the reasonable accommodation requirement in this scenario is fair under the definition employed.
By granting the disabled individual an accommodation, the employer has done nothing to place the able-bodied individual at a
disadvantage. The employer has simply removed the barrier that
prevents the disabled employee from being on equal footing as
able-bodied employees.
C.

The ADA's Recognition of Potential Unfairness

Several other provisions of the ADA work in conjunction with
the factors discussed above49 to help alleviate unfairness
problems in the employment setting. In order to be entitled to
an accommodation, a disabled individual must first be able to
perform the "essential functions" of the position with or without
a reasonable accommodation.5" According to the Interpretative
Guidance offered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), whether a function is essential depends on
whether an employer actually requires employees in the position
to perform the function.5 1 Although the employer may not avoid
48 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998) (Interpretive Guidance).
49 See supra notes 41-47.
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(B)(8) (1994).

51 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (Interpretive Guidance). The EEOC lists several factors to consider in making the determination whether a function is "essential," including: (1) whether the position exists to perform a particular function; (2) the
number of other employees available to pertorm that job function o among whom
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having to make an accommodation simply by classifying a function as "essential," the EEOC's guidance makes clear that the
inquiry "is not intended to second guess an employer's business
judgment with regard to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require employers to lower such standards."5 2 For example, "if an employer requires its typists to be
able to accurately type seventy-five words per minute, it will not
be called upon to explain why an inaccurate work product, or a
typing speed of sixty-five words per minute, would not be
adequate."5 3
Therefore, the "essential function" requirement helps to prevent any unfair advantage over non-disabled workers. An employer is not required to lower the standards with which a
qualified individual with a disability must comply if such standards are essential to the job. If a disabled individual cannot rise
to the qualitative or quantitative levels required of a position
even with an accommodation, the ADA does nothing to assist
the individual.5 4
The reasonable accommodation requirement also takes into
account the potential impact on other employees in assessing a
requested accommodation. The implementing regulations provide that a reasonable accommodation may include reassignment
to a vacant position. 55 However, the ADA does not actually require an employer to "bump" an employee from an existing position in order to accommodate the disabled individual.5 6
Finally, the ADA's "undue hardship" standard may also function to alleviate unfairness concerns. Under Title I, an employer
is not required to make an accommodation if it can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship to the
business. 57 The EEOC defines "undue hardship" as "significant
difficulty or expense in, or resulting from, the provision of the
accommodation. ' 58 The undue hardship standard is typically
thought of as an affirmative defense preventing unfairness to the
the performance of the job function can be distributed; and (3) the degree of expertise or skill required to perform the function. See id.
52 Id.
53 Id.

54 See id.
55 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).
56 See, e.g., McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating the same).
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
58 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (Interpretive Guidance).
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employer; 59 however, it may also function as a means of preventing unfairness among similarly-situated employees. The assessment of whether an accommodation poses an undue hardship
necessarily involves the consideration of "the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties."' If the accommodation would prove unduly disruptive, it may pose an undue
burden. 6 ' Thus, the undue hardship standard, in practice, may
sometimes work to prevent unfairness not only to the employer,
but also to other employees.
As can be seen, the ADA's "thicket of interlocking definitions
and requirements"6 2 helps alleviate the potential unfairness of
the reasonable accommodation requirement in the workplace.
The "otherwise qualified" and "essential function" standards directly limit the reach of the reasonable accommodation requirement and insure that only those who are prevented from
performing by reason of their disability are entitled to an accommodation. The undue hardship standard, largely targeted toward
relieving the burden on employers, also reduces unfairness
among employees. Additionally, the very nature of the workplace makes the unfairness problems inherent in the reasonable
accommodation requirement appear un-problematic. In this regard, the ADA can be said to be more or less "fair" when it deals
with the typical case of a worker seeking to overcome a disability
and become a working member of society.
II
FAIRNESS IN STANDARDIZED TESTING: THE
THE EDUCATION CONTEXT

ADA

IN

Most of the law that has been made in ADA cases has developed in the context of employment discrimination claims.63 As
one moves farther away from the traditional employment setting,
however, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement
begins to raise issues of fundamental fairness not present in most
employment cases. Accordingly, this part analyzes situations involving accommodation requests in more competitive settings:
59

See, e.g., Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1058 (5th Cir. 1997).
60 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v).
61 See id. § 1630.2(p) (Interpretive Guidance).
62 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 8.
63 See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 460
(6th Cir. 1997).
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specifically, the case of accommodation requests made by stu-

dents taking standardized tests, such as the Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) and applicants for the bar examination. This section
further considers the fairness ramifications that result from the
collision between the reasonable accommodation requirement
and the fairness-based justifications for the underlying rules.
A.

Titles H and III of the ADA, and the RehabilitationAct
of 1973

Titles II and III of the ADA govern discrimination in public
services and places of public accommodations. 64 In addition to
outlawing discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability, Title II prohibits the exclusion from participation in or
the denial of the benefits, services, programs, or activities of a
public entity because of such disability.6 5 Public entities typically
include state or local governments, their agencies, and public entities providing public transportation. 66 Title III prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, wages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation" or by an
operator of such a place.6 7 In order to be considered a place of
public accommodation, an entity must operate a business which
falls within one of the twelve categories listed in the statute.6 8
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182(a) (1994).
65
66
67
68

See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
See id. §§ 12132(1)(A)-(B), 12141 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994). The twelve categories are:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place
of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
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The reasonable accommodation requirement in public accommodation settings functions much as it does under Title I. Title
III, for example, states that it is a discriminatory practice for a
place of public accommodation to fail to make:
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,
facilities, privileges,
69
advantages, or accommodations.
The requirements under Title II are largely the same.7 0 The Rehabilitation Act also imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation upon those receiving federal financial assistance, unless such
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.7 1 Therefore,
entities covered under these statutes are required to modify existing programs and policies in order to accommodate the disabled unless such a modification would "impose[] undue
financial and administrative burdens . . .or require[] a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program. "72
B.

Issues of Fairness in Accommodating the Disabled in
Standardized Testing

Due to the extreme time pressures of most exams, nearly every
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation.
Id.
69 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Neither the ADA nor the
implementing regulations established by the Department of Justice provide any definition for the phrase "fundamentally alter the nature." The first synonym provided
by Webster's for "nature" is "essence." WEBSTER'S NniTH NEW COLLEGIATE DicTIONARY 789 (1986). This Article employs the same definition.
70 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 35.130(b)(7) (1994) (stating that a public entity shall make
reasonable modifications unless the making of such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity).
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1998).
72 Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.
1995) (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17
(1987)).
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law student has left a law school exam thinking: "If I only had ten
more minutes, I could have said everything I wanted to say." In
some instances, disabled students are given extra time to do the
work their peers must do in a shorter period. Thus, the reasonable accommodation requirement sometimes may implicate notions of fairness in testing. Further, given the widespread use of
standardized college entrance exams, such as the SAT, the reasonable accommodation requirement creates the potential for
unfairness to a great many non-disabled students.73
1.

The Competitive Aspect of Standardized Test Taking

Undergraduate and graduate programs rely on standardized
tests, such as the SAT or LSAT, in making admissions decisions.7 4 These tests employ methodologies designed to insure
that all examinees take the test under the same conditions.7 5
Thus, there is a competitive aspect to the tests-applicants take
the tests under the same conditions in order to compete for the
limited number of available slots for entering students at the
learning institution of their choice. The most common form of
modification offered by the College Board, the administrators of
the SAT, is the allowing of extended time for disabled students.7 6
Allowing extended time for disabled students may, in some
cases, create the potential for unfairness. All other factors being
equal, a student who scores lower on the SAT than her disabled
counterpart who was allowed a modification of the testing procedures may find herself at a disadvantage in the admissions
process.
Title III of the ADA bans discrimination based upon disability
by private entities furnishing examinations. Title III specifically
provides that companies offering examinations related to applications for secondary or post-secondary education must offer
such examinations in a place and manner accessible to persons
73 See generally Diana C. Pullin & Kevin J. Heaney, The Use of Flagged Test
Scores in College and University Admissions: Issues and Implications Under Section
504 of the RehabilitationAct and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 23 J.C. & U.L.

797, 812 (1997) (referring to the SAT and ACT as "the most widely used" entrance
examinations and noting that more than one million students took the SAT in 1995).
For an interesting overview of disability law in the education context, see Laura F.
Rothstein, Higher Education and Disabilities:Trends and Developments, 27 STETSON

L. REv. 119 (1997).
74 Pullin & Heaney, supra note 73, at 812.
75 Id. at 813.
76 Id. at 817.
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with disabilities, or offer alternative accessible arrangements for
such individuals. 77 Courts have interpreted this provision as requiring entities to make reasonable modifications to testing
procedures.7 8

Of the more than one million students taking the SAT in 1995,
over sixteen thousand students with disabilities took the test
under nonstandard conditions. 79 One of the more concerning aspects of the results from such tests is that, although nonstandard
tests are generally reliable, tests administered with extended time
for completion, the most common form of accommodation, tend
to overpredict a student's future college performance. 80 Thus, if
a college relies solely on a student's SAT scores to determine
admission, students who are permitted to take the test with extended time may have an unfair advantage over other students
because their scores do not accurately predict performance to the
same extent as their able-bodied counterparts. These conclusions suggest that the allowance of extra time is an inexact science, 8 1 and unless this unreliability is somehow factored into the
admissions equation, non-disabled students may be put at a disadvantage by the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement.
2.

Factors Mitigating Against Unfairness

Of course, universities rarely rely solely on an applicant's SAT
scores in making admissions decisions. The mere fact that Student A has an SAT score of 1500 and Student B has an SAT
score of 1470 does not necessarily mean that Student A will be
going to Harvard and Student B will not. Most colleges base
their admissions decisions on a variety of factors, including an
applicant's Grade Point Average (GPA), extracurricular activities, and maybe even the fact that his or her parents are large
contributors to the university's endowment fund. Consideration
of other factors, apart from performance on the SAT, helps to
See 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (1994).
See, e.g., D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217
(W.D.N.Y. 1993).
79 Pullin & Heaney, supra note 73, at 812-13.
80
Id. at 817.
81 See generally id. (citing the need for further research to establish comparable
tests for students with disabilities and the possibly "insurmountable" technical constraints on developing such a test).
77
78
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reduce the unfairness inherent under the current system. 82
Additionally, many universities engage in the practice of "flagging" nonstandard test scores.8 3 Under this practice, university
personnel review an applicant's file containing such a score and
assess the reliability of the score.' While at least two commentators have questioned the legality under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of flagging nonstandard test scores,85 the practice
does have the effect of at least allowing the university to mitigate
any unfairness stemming from the taking of such tests.
Finally, the unfairness of permitting students to take tests with
extended time is mitigated by the very nature of the tests themselves. Although the testing procedures are designed to insure a
laboratory-like condition for applicants,86 the taking of the SAT
is not truly a zero-sum game. It is not fundamentally competitive
in the same manner as, for example, a sporting event. The SAT
is designed to predict future academic performance, not to determine winners and losers. Although it may seemingly create such
categories, a student who scores higher than her friend on the
SAT does not "beat" her friend; she merely showed a higher aptitude for success in college. A deficiency in a student's SAT
score may be compensated for by a variety of factors, thus limiting the negative effect of a lower SAT score. Any unfairness that
may result from an inflated, quantitative SAT score may be counterbalanced by consideration of other quantitative and qualitative factors.87
Of course, none of this should detract from the point that tests
given with extended time for completion tend to place the testtaker at an advantage over others. The ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement may even mandate such a result.
82 See

id.

83 Id. at 818-21.
84
1d.
85 See id. at 821-25. The authors' argument is that by flagging such scores, admin-

istrators are actually alerting admissions officers that an individual has a learning
disability, thus having the effect of being a preadmission inquiry into a person's disability in violation of the ADA. See id. at 821-22.
86 See generally id. at 812-13 ("Large-scale, standardized tests ... us[e] methodologies designed to insure that all examinees take the test under the same conditions.
This assures that the resulting scores offer the basis for uniform inferences based
upon the scores of the examinees who took the test.").
87 See id. at 817. Some institutions have developed special admissions programs
that allow students who do not meet the minimum admissions requirements to
demonstrate that they are actually deserving of admission. See Rothstein, supra
note 73, at 122.
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What prevents this result from rising to the level of unconscionable unfairness is the nature of the test itself and the purposes for
which it is administered. So long as administrators and admissions officers pay careful attention to the issue of fairness in considering the scores from disabled students who have been
permitted to take standardized tests under nonstandard conditions, the reasonable accommodation does not, by itself, create
an intolerably unfair situation.
C. Bar Exams
Nearly any testing situation involving efforts to accommodate
the disabled could potentially raise fairness concerns for other
test-takers. For example, if a disabled student is allowed extra
time to complete an exam, and steps are not taken to insure that
the extra time is not disproportionate to the actual amount of
time needed to place the disabled student on the same level as
other students, the disabled student may gain an advantage. This
concern is particularly pressing when the stakes involved in passing an exam are high, and, unlike in the case of college admissions, no factor other than an individual's raw score may be used
to mitigate unfairness.
In the leading case on the ADA in the bar examination context, a New York federal district court was confronted with such
a fairness question. At issue in D'Amico v. New York State
Board of Law Examiners8 8 was a disabled applicant's request
that the Board permit her to take the bar exam over a four-day
period instead of the normal two-day period.8 9 The plaintiff in
D'Amico suffered from a severe myopic condition that worsened
as a result of extended reading.9" After failing the bar examination on her first attempt, D'Amico requested that she be permitted to take the exam over a period of four days instead of the
normal two. 91
In assessing the plaintiff's ADA claim, the court was particularly mindful of the potential advantage D'Amico might gain as a
result of the requested modification. The D'Amico court stated:
"There is a delicate balance that must be made in determining
88 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).

See id. at 219.
90 See id. at 218.
91 See id. at 218-19. D'Amico's ophthalmologist explained that simply giving her
unlimited time over two days would actually worsen her cundition. id. at 222.
89
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the reasonableness of a given request especially when it relates to
examinations and testing procedures."9 2 Thus, the court recognized that, if D'Amico's requested modification were to go beyond what was actually necessary to place her on "equal footing"
with other applicants, the modification would provide her with
an unfair advantage.9 3
After concluding that "the most important fact that the Court
must consider in determining the reasonableness of the Board's
examination is the nature and extent of the plaintiff's disability,"
the court found that D'Amico's request was reasonable. 94 Implicit in the court's reasoning is the assumption that the four-day
time period was the appropriate modification to place D'Amico
on equal footing with other applicants. Thus, in the court's view,
the modification simply placed the plaintiff at the same level as
other applicants and did not provide her with an unfair
advantage.
1.

Factors Mitigating Against Unfairness

Although D'Amico and other bar examination cases raise fairness concerns, the concerns do not rise to the same level as those
implicated in cases such as Martin. Although it is arguably "unfair" to permit any applicant to take a test under different guidelines, the nature of the bar examination helps to distinguish these
types of cases from that in Martin.
•Unlike a professional golf tournament, there is no tangible
benefit in passing the bar with a higher score than another applicant. If one applicant passes with the highest score in her state
and another passes by the skin of her teeth, neither party stands
in a better position than the other. Passage of the bar exam only
requires that an applicant correctly answer enough questions to
pass. If a court incorrectly concludes that a modification does no
more than is necessary to place a disabled applicant at the same
level as others, when in fact the modification does give the appliId. at 221.
93 Id. Similar to the above hypothetical, if D'Amico were given twenty hours to
92

complete the exam, when other applicants had only thirteen hours, and D'Amico
actually only required eighteen hours to place her on equal footing, she would be
receiving a distinct advantage that would exceed the requirements of the ADA. See
generally id. at 221 ("[Tlhe ADA was not meant to give the disabled advantages
over other applicants. The purpose of the ADA is to place those with disabilities on
an equal footing and not to give them an unfair advantage.").
94 Id. at 221, 223.
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cant an advantage, the non-disabled are not significantly harmed.
The performance of the disabled student is irrelevant to the ques-

tion of whether the non-disabled student will pass the bar and
become an attorney. 95

Admittedly, there may be a certain psychic harm done in
knowing that another applicant had an unfair advantage and the
end result of permitting such an advantage might not be "fair"
under the normal conception of that term; however, the funda-

mental nature of the bar examination is not inherently competitive. Consideration of the disabled applicant's time-enhanced

score does not effect the correctness of the non-disabled appli95 A more difficult problem, however, involves providing extra time in exams for
learning disabled law students. Generally, law schools have been somewhat reluctant to provide accommodations for learning disabled students. See Jane Easter
Bahls, Disability Dilemma, STUDENT LAW., May 1998, at 20. Part of the reluctance
stems from a belief that learning disabilities concern capacities that are essential to
the practice of law, such as the ability to concentrate and process information. Id.
Another concern is fairness. Id. The stakes involved in law school education are
high. It is no secret that better academic performance often translates into higher
paying jobs. Students compete for interviews and jobs based largely in part on their
academic records. Providing a learning disabled student with extra time on exams,
which are often the sole factor in determining a student's grade, could potentially
place that student at an advantage over other students when employers begin considering the records of competing students.
Consider the following hypothetical:
A law school professor bases her students' grades solely on their performance on one three-hour exam. The professor uses a curved grading
scale, on which there are a fixed number of people who may attain a particular grade. For example, only 5 students will get "A"s, 10 students will get
"B"s, etc. Due to a learning disability, one student is allowed an additional
hour and a half to complete his exam. With the exception of the disabled
student, every other student in the class turns in their exam exactly three
hours after the test begins. Unbeknownst to the professor, the disabled
student, or the law school administration, the actual amount of additional
time the disabled student needed to place him on the same footing as other
students was only thirty minutes. The disabled student has gained a sixty
minute advantage, and, as a result, is able to give a more complete answer
to the final question than his counterparts.
Due to the strength of his final answer, the disabled student gets the last
of the five "A"s allocated for the exam, narrowly edging out another student who had to outline his final answer.
The result in this hypothetical clearly seems unfair by any conception of the term.
In direct, head-to-head competition with other students, the disabled student received additional un-needed time which enabled him to bump one of his competitors
down to a lower level. The disabled student's gain translates into a direct loss for
the able-bodied student. Although there are certainly other factors that go into an
employer's hiring decision, this gain could potentially play a large factor in determining a student's grade point average, whether the student makes Law Review, or
whether an employer grants a student an interview.
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cant's answers, nor does it lessen that applicant's chances of passing. One person's gain does not place another in a lesser
position.96 Although, as the D'Amico court recognized, there
are clearly issues of fairness present in such testing situations,9 7
they do not rise to the same level as in some other cases.
III
THE

ADA

IN ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS

In recent years, courts have faced a growing number of cases
involving academic eligibility requirements for student-athletes.
Increasingly, learning disabled students seek redress from courts
in order to force the governing bodies of schools or athletic associations to modify existing eligibility requirements.9" In dealing with this issue, courts have attempted to walk the fine line
between accommodating the disabled and fundamentally altering
the competitive nature of sports.
A.

NCAA Cases

The National College Athletic Association (NCAA) establishes minimum academic eligibility standards for new college
students to participate in intercollegiate sports.99 The NCAA bases its eligibility requirements on such factors as a student's completion of high school "core courses," attainment of a minimum
GPA in those core courses, and the student's standardized college entrance examination scores.1"' According to the NCAA,
96 See supra text accompanying note 38 (defining "fairness" for purposes of this
Article).
97 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
98 See Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Bowers v. NCAA, 974
F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996). See generally W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the
NCAA's Efforts to Clean up its Image Have Createdan Ethical and Legal Dilemma,
7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465 (1997) (discussing the challenges confronting learning disabled students to the eligibility requirements of the NCAA). Another area rife with
controversy involves the qualification of disabled athletes who wish to participate in
college athletics, but are denied the opportunity for fear that there is a likelihood of
substantial harm for the athlete should he participate. See Knapp v. Northwestern
Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Eldon L. Ham, When Athletes Want to
Play but Doctors Say No, it's Off to Court, CH. DAILY L. BULL. Feb. 20, 1998, at 6
(discussing the Knapp case and others).
99 See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1.
100 See id. at *2. According to NCAA rules, "core course[s]" include English,
Mathematics, Natural Science, Social Science, and two years of a Foreign Language,
Computer, or Religion. See Miller, supra note 98, at 477 n.90 (citing NCAA
Rules).
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the purposes of these requirements are: (1) to insure that student-athletes are representative of the college community and
not recruited solely for athletics; (2) to insure that a student-athlete is academically prepared to succeed at college; and (3) to
preserve amateurism in intercollegiate sports.1 °1 NCAA bylaws
permit a member school to apply for a waiver of the eligibility
of those students who do not qualify
requirements on behalf
102
standards.
the
under
In Ganden v. NCAA, Chad Ganden, a learning-disabled swimmer, challenged the NCAA's requirements under the ADA, contending inter alia that the NCAA failed to make reasonable
modifications to its eligibility requirements to accommodate his
learning disability under Title 111.103 The NCAA declared
Ganden ineligible due to his failure to satisfy the minimum
course requirement and his failure to meet the minimum GPA
requirements.' 0 4 Due to Ganden's learning disability, he had
been unable to take all the required core courses specified by the
NCAA and instead took several other courses designed to address his specific weaknesses. 10 5 The NCAA refused to consider
these courses as core courses or modify its GPA requirements,
sued the NCAA for its alleged failure to modify its
and Ganden
10 6
criteria.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois focused
on whether Ganden's requested modifications were reasonable
or whether they would fundamentally alter the nature of the
NCAA's intercollegiate athletic program. 10 7 In order to determine whether the requested modifications were reasonable, the
court looked to the underlying purposes of the NCAA's requirement to determine if the modifications requested by Ganden
would undermine those purposes. 10 8 The court determined that
101 See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *14.
102 See id. at *3.
103 See id. at *5. Ganden also contended that the NCAA discriminated against
him because its core course requirement tended to screen him out of eligibility on
the basis of his disability in violation of Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(1). See
id.
104 See id. at *2.
105 See id. at *1, *4. These non-core courses included LRC Typing and LRC Computers. Id. For interesting background information on the story of Chad Ganden
and the NCAA, see Miller, supra note 98.
106 See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *4-*5.
107 See id. at *14.
108 See id. at *15.
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the core course requirement served the NCAA's important interests of insuring the integrity of a student's GPA. This requirement also ensures that student-athletes are representative of the
college community and are academically prepared to succeed in
college. 10 9 The court noted that the NCAA could still serve
these purposes by considering other factors aside from completion of core courses. For example, the NCAA could consider the
fact that in the case of disabled students, steady improvement in
remedial courses might adequately serve as a substitute for core
10
courses.
The court determined, however, that in Ganden's case, his
non-core courses had little similarity to the required core courses
and they could not be considered an effective substitute so as to
insure the goals of the NCAA."' The court stated: "While Title
III may require the NCAA to count courses as 'core' even if they
are not substantively identical to approved 'core courses,' it does
not require the NCAA to count courses with little substantive
similarity.""' 2 As such, consideration of the remedial courses
would fundamentally alter the privilege of participating in swimming.113 Applying this reasoning to the NCAA's GPA requirement, the court concluded that Ganden's requested modification
of lowering the GPA requirement would work an even more fundamental alteration of the nature of the NCAA's program and
114
thus rejected Ganden's claim.
B.
1.

High School Athletics

Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association

Ronald Sandison and Craig Stanley were both high school student-athletes who suffered from learning disabilities. 1' 5 As a result of their disabilities, both students were two school grades
behind their age group, and by the beginning of their senior
years, both had turned nineteen years of age." 6 Both Sandison
109
110

See id.
See id.
111 See id. (finding that the grades from such courses did not provide valid indications of Ganden's academic potential).
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See id. at *16.
115 Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1028 (6th Cir.
1995).
116 See id.
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and Stanley ran cross-country and track for their local high
schools, but were prevented from competing their senior years
due to a regulation by the Michigan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) which prohibited competition in interscholastic
sports by any student over the age of nineteen.1 1 7 In Sandison v.
Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, the two students sued the
MHSAA under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, seeking an
injunction to allow them to run and to prevent the MHSAA from
penalizing the school for permitting them to compete. 1 8 The district court determined that waiver of the nineteen-year age limit
constituted a reasonable accommodation and the MHSAA
appealed." 9
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that the MHSAA's age restriction advanced two purposes: (1) safeguarding against injury
to other players; and (2) preventing any unfair competitive advantage that older participants might have. 120 Focusing on the
effect that a waiver of the age limitation might have upon competition, the Sixth Circuit held that waiver of the rule would work a
fundamental alteration of the sports program and hence was not
a reasonable accommodation. 1 21 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, because they were not "star" players, their
advanced ages would not provide them with a competitive advantage. Focusing on the unpredictable effect that might occur to
the competitive nature of the sport were the plaintiffs permitted
to participate, the court stated:
Removing the age restriction injects into competition students
older than the vast majority of other students, and the record
shows that the older students are generally more physically
mature than younger students. Expanding the sports program
to include older students works a fundamental alteration.
Second, although the plaintiffs assert that introducing their
average athletic skills into track and cross-country competition
would not fundamentally alter the program, the record does
not reveal how the MHSAA, or anyone, can make that com1 22
petitive unfairness determination without an undue burden.
The court noted that in order to conclude that the plaintiffs' age
would not provide them with an unfair advantage, coaches and
117
118
119
120
121

See
See
See
See
See
122 Id.

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

1028-29.
1029-30.
1029.
1035.

A Good Walk Spoiled

1363

physicians would have to consider the skill level of each member
of an opposing team, the overall skill level of each opposing
team, and the skill level of each student whom the older student
displaced from the team.' 2 3 Therefore, permitting older students
to compete would fundamentally alter the nature of the program
124
and constitute an undue administrative burden.
2.

McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association

In McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, a new
plaintiff again challenged one of the MHSAA's eligibility requirements. 2 5 In this instance, the rule at issue made ineligible
1 26
any student who had completed eight semesters of high school.
This rule had the effect of excluding from competition those students who had repeated a grade during high school, the majority
of whom as a result would be older than the average competitor. 1 27 This time, however, the student-athlete in question contended that the MHSAA had in fact made the determination that
the Sixth Circuit previously found to be an undue burden;
namely, that the MHSAA had, on occasion, waived the eightsemester rule for student athletes. 28 As such, the plaintiff reasoned, the eight-semester rule was not truly necessary, and there
29
was no burden on the MHSAA to waive the rule in his case.'
The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on its opinion in Sandison in
concluding that waiving the eight-semester rule would result in a
fundamental alteration of Michigan's high school sports programs. 130 The court determined that the purposes served by the
age-limit rule and the eight-semester rule were largely the same:
[B]oth are intended to limit the level of athletic experience
and range of skills . . . in order to create a more even playing
field for the competitors, to limit the size and physical maturity
of high school athletes for the safety of all participants, and to
afford the players who observe the [rules], presumably athletes of less maturity, a fair opportunity to compete for playing
time. 131
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See id.
See id.
See id. at 455.
McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 456, 461.
Id. at 461.

Id.
See id. at 462.
Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
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Forced to deal with the fact that the MHSAA had actually
waived the eight-semester rule in the past, a fact that seemed to
undercut the MHSAA's assertion that waiver would result in an
uneven playing field, the court found an additional purpose of
the eight-semester rule that made preservation of the rule necessary: the rule helped to eliminate "red-shirting," a practice by
which a student repeats a grade in order to gain another year's
worth of physical development, and, consequently, an advantage
over his competitors.' 3 2 As for the fact that the MSHAA had
previously waived the rule for other student-athletes, the court
noted that the plaintiff was not merely seeking a waiver for himself. Instead, he was seeking to require the MHSAA to waive
the eight-semester requirement for all learning-disabled students
who remain in school more than eight-semesters. 133 This could
potentially result in an avalanche of waiver requests and the resulting need to make an individual fairness assessment for each
request, a prospect that would "irrevocably [alter] the nature of
'134
high-school sports.
C. Altering the Level Playing Field
The decisions above highlight two important points. First, all
three cases involve rules that, to varying degrees, have the effect
and purpose of creating a level playing field for competition. As
such, these cases help to illustrate the tension that exists between
the reasonable accommodation requirement under Title III and
the purposes of rules that promote fairness in competition. Secondly, these cases are instructive for their handling of the reasonable accommodation analysis necessary in these types of cases.
The eligibility rules at issue in Ganden, Sandison, and McPherson were intended to create a level playing field for competitors.
For example, two of the purposes behind the core course and
GPA requirements in Ganden were to insure that student-athletes are representative of the college community and not re132 See id. at 461-63. The concern over "red-shirting" was particularly relevant in
this case as Dion McPherson, the student in question, had not been diagnosed with a
learning disability until after his eight-semester eligibility had been exhausted. See
id. at 456. Thus, the MHSAA argued that allowing a waiver would create a precedent whereby "a school district can have control over a player's eligibility, find that
player to be ineligible, and then later, when he was physically and athletically matured, find him eligible." Id. at 463. This practice would give the "green light" to
rampant red-shirting by school districts and coaches. Id.
133 See id. at 462.
134 Id. at 463.
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cruited solely for athletics, thus preserving amateurism in
intercollegiate sports. 1 35 Implicitly, the rule sought to establish a
playing field on which only athletes of roughly the same skill
level could compete and exclude from competition those athletes
who were amateur in name only. Similarly, the purposes behind
the eligibility rules in Sandison and McPherson were to prevent
older students from gaining a competitive advantage over both
they might
their competitors and those whose place on the team
1 36
take as a result of their advanced development.
The purposes of these rules, however, are also distinguishable.
Although the NCAA's rules in Ganden were related to the preservation of a level playing field, they also were designed to serve
goals unrelated to competitive fairness. One of the purposes of
the NCAA's eligibility requirements was to "insure that a stu137
dent-athlete is academically prepared to succeed at college.
Indeed, the court in Ganden seemed to focus on this purpose
almost to the exclusion of the other stated purposes.1 38 From the
court's discussion, it is clear that the main purpose of the
NCAA's eligibility requirements was not to insure fairness in the
competitive playing of sports, but to promote the concept of a
"student-athlete.' 1 39 The fact that an athlete failed to pass senior
English class in no way implies that he is somehow "better" at a
sport than his competitors; however, it does say something about
whether he is truly a student-athlete or simply an athlete.
By contrast, the fact that a nineteen-year old athlete is competing against fourteen- and fifteen-year olds suggests that the
nineteen-year-old enjoys a competitive advantage over his competitors by virtue of his age and increased physical development. 140 Thus, the age and eight-semester rules in Sandison and
McPherson were designed specifically to insure a level playing
135 See Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *14 (N.D. I11.Nov.
21, 1996).
136 McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461; Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995).
137 Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *14.
138 See generally id. at *15 (discussing the important interest of insuring that student-athletes are prepared to succeed in college).
139 See id. at *16-17.
140 For example, one of the findings of fact in Ganden was that the peak years for
a competitive swimmer were between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one. See id.
at *5. Therefore, a nineteen-year old who was still competing in high school would
clearly have a competitive advantage against his competitors, many of whom would
be substantially younger.

1366

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77, 19981

field, whereas the core course and GPA requirements in Ganden
had the incidental purpose of achieving this goal. In other words,
the rules in Sandison and McPherson which are designed specifically to insure that no competitor has an advantage over another
are "leveling" rules.
Hence, because the rules at issue in Sandison and McPherson
were such leveling rules, the fairness concerns in these cases were
more pronounced than in Ganden. The age and eight-semester
rules were designed to create a laboratory-like setting where no
competitor had a distinct advantage by virtue of increased physical development. If a plaintiff could, through the ADA, require a
governing body to waive such a rule without insuring that the
playing field would not be altered, the plaintiff would be injecting
into the laboratory setting of competition an uncontrolled variable. The Sandison and McPherson decisions properly realized
that if assurances could not be made to control for the variable,
the effect would be to disadvantage the older student's competitors and those whom he displaced from the team.
The other main difference between the two lines of cases is the
issue of the necessity of an individualized inquiry into the nature
of the plaintiff's disability and the purpose of the rule that prevents him from participating. For example, the court in Ganden
methodically looked to both the purposes of the rule and
whether a reasonable accommodation was possible for the particular plaintiff.'4 1 If the remedial courses which Ganden took had
been substantially similar to the core courses he did not take, the
court hinted that his requested modification might have been
reasonable. 14 2 Indeed, the NCAA itself provides for such individualized consideration of a particular athlete's academic
14 3

record.

The ADA clearly contemplates this type of individualized inquiry 1 44 and the Ganden court took the Sandison court to task
for its failure to conduct such an inquiry. 145 The Ganden court
stated: "[T]he court believes that [Sandison] failed to adequately
analyze the purposes of the act in light of the specific claims for
See
See
143 See
144 See
need to
141

142

id. at *15.
id.
id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0) app. (1998) (Interpretive Guidance) (discussing the
determine the reasonableness of an accommodation in a particular

situation).
145

See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *14.
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modifications; i.e., the circumstances of the plaintiff and learning
1' 46
disabled students.'
This criticism has a ring of truth to it. Arguably, however, the
Sandison court may have concluded that such an individualized
inquiry was next to impossible given the fact that the purpose of
the rule was so intertwined with protecting against an unfair
competitive advantage. Assessing all of the variables involved in
making a competitive unfairness determination, including the effect on each player from each opposing team and each player
who wished to compete with the older student for playing time
and a spot on the team, would be almost impossible. 1 47 As any
alteration of the level playing field could potentially create competitive unfairness, the plaintiff was under a particularly difficult
burden to show that the accommodation was reasonable. This
conclusion was certainly weakened by the subsequent showing in
McPherson that the MHSAA had actually waived its eight-semester rule in the past. 4 8 Yet, the McPherson court properly
recognized that injecting older, more physically developed students into competition could fundamentally alter the competitive
nature of the program if steps were not taken to insure that no
such advantage would actually be realized in the case of a particular plaintiff.
Therefore, two important considerations emerge from the
above cases. First, in assessing the reasonableness of a requested
accommodation in competitive settings, courts need to look not
only at the underlying purpose of the rule in question, but also to
the individual circumstances of the plaintiff. Second, courts need
to be vigilant when dealing with leveling rules specifically
designed to create fairness so as not to permit the injection into
the laboratory setting of competition unknown variables which
may fundamentally alter the competitive nature of a program
and frustrate the intent of the rule.
IV
CASEY MARTIN

By now it should be apparent that the inquiry of what consti146 Id.
147 See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th
Cir. 1995). See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
148 See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 461 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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tutes a reasonable accommodation becomes more complicated
when one leaves the traditional sphere of the workplace and enters a competitive environment. This section attempts to synthesize some of the points previously discussed by an examination of
the case of Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 4' 9 Martin helps to illustrate
the tensions inherent in moving the reasonable accommodation
requirement into a competitive setting and further illustrates the
difficult task judges face in making the reasonable accommodation determination.
A.

Who is Casey Martin?

If there ever existed a sympathetic plaintiff, Casey Martin fit
the bill. Articulate and unfailingly polite, Martin represented the
PGA Tour's worst nightmare. Born with the congenital,
debilitating diseases known as Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, Martin's right leg is severely atrophied to about half the
size of his left leg. 15 0 Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome is a
circulatory condition which prevents the blood from flowing
through Martin's veins back to his heart and instead causes the
blood to flow back down to his leg.15 1 As a child, Martin wore
leg braces and splints on his leg.' 5 2 As he got older, Martin's
condition worsened, resulting in severe pain, restraint, and difficulty walking.'5 3 Martin's orthopedist testified that Martin is at
serious risk of fracturing his tibia "with virtually any activity."' 5 4
Fracture, in Casey Martin's case would probably result in
55
amputation.
Despite his disability, Martin is by all accounts an outstanding
golfer. 1 56 Aside from limiting his everyday activities, Martin's
condition also affects his golf game. He has great difficulty walking a golf course and on several occasions Martin withdrew from
tournaments due to the severe pain walking caused him.' 57 Even
when Martin rides from hole to hole in a golf cart, he has exper149 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998).
150 See id. at 1243.
151 See id. at 1243-44.
152 See Kindred, supra note 11, at 73.
153 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.
154 Marcia Chambers, How the Tour Lost the Case Against Casey Martin, GOLF

DIG., May 1998, at 62, 68 (quoting Martin's orthopedist, Dr. Donald Jones).
155 See id.

156 In February 1998, Martin ranked second on the Nike Tour in driving distance.
See Rick Smith, Casey at the Bat, GOLF DIG., May 1998, at 154.
157 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
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ienced such pain from the simple act of walking the short distance from the cart to the green or the tee box that he has been
forced to withdraw from competition.'5 8 His condition also affects his golf swing. Due to his weakened leg, Martin cannot
fully straighten his leg, causing him to address the ball differently
than other golfers' 59 and preventing him from pushing off with
his right leg during his backswing as most golfers do. 6 °
A former teammate of golfer Tiger Woods at Stanford University, 161 Martin is currently seeking to become a member of the
PGA Tour, the association of professional golfers.' 62 One of the
ways in which a golfer may join the elite ranks of PGA professionals is by going through the PGA qualifying school tournament and finishing among the top thirty-five contestants. 6 3
Martin applied for a waiver of the PGA's rule that prevented
contestants at the qualifying school from using carts during the
final rounds, on the PGA Tour and on the Nike Tour (a lesser
version of the PGA Tour sponsored by the PGA). 6 4 The PGA
refused Martin's request. 165 PGA Tour Commissioner Tim
Finchem defended the Tour's position, arguing that to permit an
exception to the no-cart rule would be to create an "incorrectable imbalance in playing conditions.' ' 166 Finchem stated:
"When you change the rules for one player in an athletic sport,
167
you are inherently changing the landscape of that sport.
Thus, the battle lines were drawn between a disabled individual's
need for a modification of the rules of competition, and an organization's need to set its own standards in order to promote
fair play.
B. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
Pursuant to the ADA, Casey Martin sought an injunction directing the PGA to permit him to use a cart while playing on the
15 8 See id.
159 See Dr. Bill Mallon, Clues to Disability are Hard to Find, GOLF DIG., May

1998, at 158 (analyzing Martin's swing).
160 See Smith, supra note 156, at 156.
161 See Marcia Chambers, Judge Says DisabledGolfer May Use Cart on Pro Tour,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al.
162 See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (D. Or. 1998).
163 See id. at 1321.
164
See id. at 1322.
165 See id.
166 See Chambers, supra note 154, at 68.
167 See Garrity, supra note 4, at 63 (quoting Finchem).
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Nike Tour.16 8 The PGA's fate may have been sealed when the
magistrate judge hearing the dispute rejected the PGA's argument that it was exempt from the ADA's coverage as it was
either a private, non-profit establishment, or, alternatively, not a
place of public accommodation for purposes of the ADA. 16 9 This
important ruling meant that the PGA, like any other entity, was
170
subject to the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.
1.

Identifying the Privilege at Issue

Title III of the ADA requires that a place of public accommodation make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures .. .unless the entity can demonstrate that making
such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
... privilege ... or would result in an undue burden."'' The first
step in making this determination must be to identify the policy
and the specific privilege that it monitors. 172 The policy at issue
in Martin was the no-cart rule. The question of identifying the
specific privilege at issue, however, is slightly more complex. In
order to make this determination, a court must look to the role
of the entity in question. 17 3 For example, in Ganden v. NCAA,
the plaintiff attempted to characterize the privilege that the
NCAA provided as "swimming competitions.' 74 The court rejected this overly narrow view of the privilege. Because the
NCAA "offers its competitors more than an opportunity to swim,
but also to represent the NCAA's member institutions," the privilege at issue was more correctly defined as the NCAA's entire
intercollegiate athletic program. 7 5
The Martin court correctly identified the privilege at issue as
playing in PGA and Nike Tour competitions, rather than simply
the privilege of playing golf.'7 6 The distinction is more than se168

See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.

169 See id. at 1325, 1327.
170 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of this
aspect of the Martin decision).
171 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
172 See Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, *14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,
1996).
173 See generally id. (emphasizing the role of the NCAA to promote, not just competition, but the concept of the student-athlete).

174

See id.

Id.
See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246, 1249 n.10 (D. Or. 1998)
("I agree with the PGA that only the nature of the PGA and Nike Tour golf may be
175

176
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mantic. The fundamental nature of the game of golf that most
Americans play, i.e., the game played by weekend duffers with
their friends, is a far cry from the version played by PGA and
Nike Tour professionals. The latter version of "golf" involves
some of the finest players in the world competing specifically in
order to make a living as professionals. Given the proliferation
of golf carts on public and private courses throughout the country, it would be difficult for any entity to argue that allowing carts
would fundamentally alter the more common form of golf.1 77
The inherent nature of competition on the PGA and Nike Tours,
however, makes such an argument more believable.
2.

The Need for an Individual Inquiry

In determining the reasonableness of modification, a court
must also look to the underlying purpose of a policy to determine
if the requested modification would undermine those purposes in
the circumstances of the plaintiff. 178 The Martin court conducted
this inquiry. 179 According to the PGA Tour, the purpose of the
no-cart rule is "to inject the element of fatigue into the skill of
shot-making." 18 The primary purpose of the rule, therefore, is
not to create a level playing field (although it has that effect), but
instead to inject another element into the game. As such, it is
not a true leveling rule.
The analysis of whether an accommodation undermines a
rule's purpose necessarily requires that a court focus on the particular plaintiff rather than a disabled plaintiff in the abstract.
After considering at length the extent of Casey Martin's disability, the court concluded that Martin's disability actually served
the same purpose as the no-cart rule. The Martin court stated:
"The fatigue [Martin] endures just from coping with his disability
is undeniably greater than the fatigue injected into tournament
play on the able-bodied by the requirement that they walk from
shot to shot." 1 8' In other words, Martin's disability served as a
substitute for the artificial no-cart rule for the able-bodied.
considered in determining whether the requested modification would cause a fundamental alteration.").
177 See generally id. at 1249 ("Nothing in the Rules of Golf requires or defines
walking
as part of the game.").
178
See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *15.
179 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.
180 See id. at 1250.
181 Id. at 1251.
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Assuming arguendo the court was correct in its determination
that Martin's disability actually causes greater fatigue for Martin
than walking does for the average golfer,1 82 the purpose of the
The court's
PGA's rule is accomplished by Martin being Martin.
1 83
sound.
was
analysis
the
of
stage
this
at
reasoning
3.

The Question of FundamentalAlteration

The final step in determining the reasonableness of a requested modification is assessing whether the modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the privilege at issue.
Although the analysis is somewhat different, similar considerations are involved in determining the reasonableness of an accommodation in the employment setting. The requirement that a
disabled individual be capable of performing the essential function of a position is somewhat analogous to the question of determining whether an accommodation would fundamentally alter
the nature of a privilege. Competitive settings, however, require
a more precise determination into the nature of the privilege.
This is where the Martin decision becomes susceptible to
criticism.
Recall the case of Ganden v. NCAA, involving the swimmer
seeking a waiver of the NCAA's GPA and "core course" eligibility requirements. 184 The Ganden court concluded that the purpose behind the rules-insuring that student-athletes are
prepared to succeed at college-would be frustrated by permitting Ganden to compete.185 Allowing the swimmer to count remedial courses, which bore little resemblance to core courses,
would frustrate the purpose of the rule and fundamentally alter
the nature of the privilege;' 86 however, the court left open the
possibility that remedial courses could, in some circumstances,
serve the same purpose as core courses, "even if not qualitatively
and quantitatively identical to other 'core courses."" 87 The fact
that there was not an exact match between the substitute and the
normal requirement would not be fatal. Thus, although taking
182 Given the severity of Martin's affliction, this conclusion seems reasonable. See
supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
183 See generally Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *15 (explaining that remedial
courses may adequately substitute for core courses).
184 See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
185 See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *15.
186 See id. at *15-16.
187
Id.at *15.
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remedial courses might not be the equivalent of taking core
courses, if the course substituted was close enough in content, it
could be sufficient.
The principal purpose behind the eligibility requirement in
Ganden was not to create a level playing field.' 8 Therefore, if
the remedial courses were only a rough approximation of the
core courses, no competitive unfairness would necessarily flow
from permitting a student to compete. If a swimmer's comprehension of American History was slightly less, but fairly close, to
his competitors', this would in no way improve the swimmer's
chances of winning.
In contrast, consider the nineteen-year old age limitation in
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association. The age
requirement was a "leveling" rule, designed to prevent any unfair
advantage by older students.18 9 If a star nineteen-year old athlete happened to be hitting his athletic peak during high school
track season, he would be at a distinct advantage over his
younger competitors by virtue of his age. Preventing this competitive advantage would require a precise (and probably impossible) assessment into the abilities of all other similarly-situated
athletes. 190 As the nature of athletics is highly competitive and
any advantage, no matter how small, may mean the difference
between winning and losing, the fundamental competitive nature
of a sport could easily be altered by permitting an older student
to participate. Thus, the court in Sandison was concerned about
the potentially unfair effect of allowing older students to
compete.
These same concerns were prevalent in Martin. Golf is a game
which decides who wins and loses based on quantifiable measures-the golfer with the lowest score wins. There are no other
considerations. Unlike the SAT where a person with a lower
score does not necessarily "lose,"' 91 professional golf, and nearly
all professional sports, decides winners and losers on solely quantitative grounds. It is extremely difficult (and perhaps impossible) to say for certain how much an unquantifiable factor, such as
a competitor's fatigue, translates into quantifiable terms. Does
188 See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
190 Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir.
1995).
191 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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the fact that one competitor feels less fatigue than another give
him a one shot advantage? Perhaps two? If he has attained this
advantage through artificial means, then both the level playing
field and the fundamentally competitive nature of the game have
been altered.
This argument was advanced publicly by the PGA in its dispute with Casey Martin. PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem
testified that even if Martin gained only a slight advantage over
other golfers by virtue of being permitted to ride a cart, it would
192
create an incorrectable imbalance in playing conditions.
Finchem explained that the difference in skill level among PGA
professionals was so slight that even one missed or gained stroke
per round could make a dramatic difference in a player's earnings over the course of a year. 193 Indeed, often one stroke may
result in the gain or loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in
one tournament alone. 194 Implicitly, if permitting Martin to ride
did not place him on exactly the same level as other golfers, Martin would have a competitive advantage that would fundamentally alter the nature of PGA and Nike events. Simply placing
Martin "close enough" to other competitors would not be fair.
This reasoning is bolstered by the rules-oriented nature of golf.
The 1998 version of the Rules of Golf attempts to cover nearly
any contingency that may occur on a golf course. There are rules
governing a player's conduct when his ball comes to rest on a
water sprinkler; 195 rules concerning what imperfections on the
green a golfer may attempt to repair; 196 and rules governing penalty strokes for a violation of the rules. 197 In addition, there is
also an abundance of rules governing play before a player ever
sets foot on the course. There are rules limiting the number of
clubs a player may carry with him;198 rules covering the size,
192 See Chambers, supra note 154, at 68.
193 See id.
194 As an example, golfer Mark O'Meara won the 1998 Masters Tournament by
making a long putt on the final hole to win by one shot. His purse was $576,000.
See Clifton Brown, A Major Putt for a Major Title; O'Meara Sinks a 20-Footer on
No. 18 to Win in Augusta, N.Y. TiMEs, April 13, 1998, at C1. The second-place
finisher pocketed $281,600, a difference of $294,400. See George Willis, Unlucky
Thirteen Kills Couples Dream, N.Y. PosT, April 13, 1998, at 66.
195 See UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIAnON, THE RULES OF GOLF 1998-1999,
Rule 24-2 (1997).
196 See id. Rule 16-1(a).
197 See, e.g., id. Rule 2-6 ("The penalty for a breach of a Rule in match play is loss
of hole except when otherwise provided.").
198 See id. Rule 4-4.
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weight, and composition of the balls a golfer may use; 199 and
rules governing the type of clubs a player may employ.2 "
These latter kinds of rules are essentially "leveling" rules.
They seek to create a laboratory condition for the playing of golf.
Permitting a non-disabled golfer to use a non-approved, or
"hot," golf ball, for example, would fundamentally alter the competitive nature of a match by providing him with an advantage
over other golfers in the type of equipment used. From an early
age, the rules of the game are instilled in golfers, and the PGA
and golfers alike enforce them with near-religious fervor.2 10
Further insuring the laboratory setting of tournament golf is
the fact that golf, perhaps more than any other sport, is a game of
inches. A golfer who hits a shot that takes an unlucky bounce
two inches to the right may end up in the deep grass known as
the "rough." From the rough, the player has less control over her
shot and may be forced to select a different club, alter her swing,
or change her strategy for her next shot. If, however, the player's
ball takes a lucky bounce and ends up two inches to the left, the
player may be in the shorter grass known as the "fairway." From
the fairway, a professional golfer has greater control over her
next shot and may attempt nearly any shot in her arsenal. These
are the types of chance occurrences that help separate winners
and losers in golf.
In assessing Casey Martin's claim, the court paid little attention to the drastic effects that permitting even a slight advantage
might cause. Once the court concluded that the fatigue Martin
endures simply from coping with his disability is greater than the
fatigue able-bodied golfers face by being forced to walk from
shot to shot, the PGA's competitive advantage argument was
rendered moot. If Martin was still at a comparative disadvantage
even by being allowed to ride, his accommodation could not alter
the competitive nature of an event.
In making this determination, the court turned the PGA's own
199 See id. Rule 5-1.
200 See id. Rule 4-1.
201 As an example, in 1996 golfer Greg Norman disqualified himself from a tournament for what can only be considered the most trivial of offenses-he used a golf
ball that did not conform to United States Golf Association requirements because
the marking on the ball was improperly stamped. Instead of the ball reading "XS90," the ball simply read "XS-9." For want of a zero, the ball was illegal. See Jack
Cavanaugh, Missing Zero on Ball Leads to Norman's Disqualification,N.Y. TiMEs,
June 30, 1996, at Section 8, p.1 .
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practices against it. The court noted that the PGA permits cart
usage for those who so opt at two of the four types of tournaments it stages.2 °2 For the court, this fact was "certainly compelling evidence that even the PGA Tour does not consider walking
20 3
to be a significant contributor to the skill of shot-making.
Further undercutting the PGA's argument was the fact that the
''vast majority" of competitors opted to walk instead of ride at
these tournaments.20 4 Thus, the court asked, if permitting competitors to ride truly gives them an advantage in reducing fatigue,
20 5
why do the majority of them choose to walk?
After conducting an individualized inquiry into the purpose of
the no-cart rule and determining that permitting Martin to ride a
cart would neither frustrate the purpose nor fundamentally alter
the nature of PGA and Nike events, the court ruled in favor of
Martin's request.2 0 6 In conclusion, the court opined that not only
was Martin's request reasonable under the ADA, it was "emi20 7
nently reasonable in light of Casey Martin's disability.
C.

The PotentialImpact of Martin

As mentioned previously, perhaps the most potentially important aspect of the Martin decision was not its determination as to
the reasonableness of permitting Martin to ride in a cart, but its
conclusion that the PGA Tour is a place of public accommodation.20 8 Critics were alarmed at the determination that an organization designed to establish the rules of a game could be required
202 See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (D. Or. 1998). Players
on the Senior Tour are permitted to ride if they choose. Carts are also allowed in
the two preliminary rounds of the PGA Qualifying School Tournament. See id. n.9.
Despite the logical appeal of the court's argument, there may in fact be logical explanations for the discrepancy. First, the Senior tour is reserved for golfers over the
age of fifty, a category of individuals one might logically expect to suffer more
greatly the effects of fatigue. See id. Competitors at the PGA Qualifying School
undergo a grueling event in which they must play 252 holes of golf, 14 entire rounds,
in order to qualify. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Or.
1998).
203 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.
204 See id. at 1251.
205 See id. One possible explanation may be that, as one pro testified, walking is
simply what most pros have done all of their lives. See Bill Plaschke, Verplank Can
Read Martin The Ride Act, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at C1 (quoting diabetic golfer

Scott Verplank).
206 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1253.
207 !d.

208 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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by the courts to alter those rules. 20 9 Outraged critics conjured up
nightmarish scenarios that might ensue from the decision: "basketball players with spring-loaded shoes; quarterbacks with signlanguage interpreters; guide dogs curling up at the feet of big
league umpires.

2 10

The true challenge courts face in addressing the ADA in competitive situations is not in dealing with these types of outlandish
examples, but instead in attempting to balance the fundamental
notion of fair play in competition with the ADA's fundamental
goal of full participation. It is not a stretch to suggest that despite the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate, many sports still
blatantly discriminate against individuals with disabilities. 21 1 In
many instances, the discrimination is easily remedied. For example, modifying starting procedures in swimming competitions to
accommodate the hard of hearing can be accomplished with no
disadvantage to able-bodied athletes by simply employing a
strobe light, in addition to the traditional starting gun, as the device that starts a race.21 2 The more difficult problem is in attempting to find the appropriate demarcation point between
accommodating the disabled and fundamentally altering the nature of a competitive activity.
In reality, it may turn out that professional golf is one of the
few sports where an accommodation of one of the major rules of
play might not fundamentally alter the nature of the game. As
the Martin court noted, the game of golf is fundamentally about
putting a ball into a hole; 213 how one gets to the hole is of secon209 Typical of this criticism are the statements of Sam Kazman, general counsel of
the Competitive Enterprise Institute:
I'm sure if during the debate over this bill (in 1990) if you had brought up
the prospect of this occurring, the most avid proponents of the bill would
have claimed you were foaming at the mouth .... It's a stretch to claim
that the golf tournament is somehow a form of public accommodation or
that it's really a workplace. Secondly, when you cross from places of employment into the realm of sports, there's a pretty strong dividing line. The
general rule of offices and factories is that those who have physical
problems ought not have it held against them. But the essence of physical
sports is competition.
Casey Martin's Ride, supra note 4, at G2 (quoting Kazman).
210 Garrity, supra note 4, at 63.
211 See Julian U. Stein, Accommodating Individuals with Disabilitiesin Regular
Sport Programs, in RISK MGMT. IN SPORT 322-23 (Herb Appenzeller ed. 1998). See
also id. at 324-25 (detailing slow progress of accommodations for the disabled in
track and field competitions).
212 See generally id. at 327 (suggesting this as one possible accommodation).
213 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1249 (D. Or. 1998).

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77, 1998]

dary importance. The same cannot be said of most other sports.
Still, Martin does pose some potentially troubling issues for
participants in competitive situations. Although measuring the
reasonableness of an accommodation in a employment or noncompetitive setting can sometimes be a difficult task, the difficulty is magnified greatly when one moves into a competitive
setting. One of the more troublesome aspects of the Martin decision was the court's failure to fully address the inherent difference between these types of settings. In one curious passage, the
court equates Casey Martin's case with the case of a disabled individual being ordered off a commercial airline by the plane's
captain because of the captain's belief that the disabled passenger is unfit to travel safely.21 4 The Martin court put forth the
analogy in an effort to demonstrate the flaw in the PGA's argument that it alone should be allowed to set the rules for its competition-both rules illustrate the "age old rule that the captain is
in charge of the ship," a rule which the ADA may sometimes
supersede.2 1 5 Although the court's point is well taken, it failed to
consider the inherent differences in the two cases. By comparing
a noncompetitive situation with a fundamentally competitive
one, the court essentially compared apples and oranges.
Although permitting a disabled individual to fly might conceivably affect the safety of other passengers, it does not place the
other passengers at any type of competitive disadvantage in the
same way as waiving a rule of golf might. Analogies to noncompetitive situations are of somewhat limited value when one enters
the realm of competition.
As Martin illustrates, perhaps the most significant difficulty in
dealing with the reasonable accommodation requirement in competitive settings is that the ADA essentially requires a court to
measure an unquantifiable factor (the level of Casey Martin's fatigue vs. the fatigue of able-bodied golfers) in a program based
on quantification (professional tournament golf). The slightest
unfairness could potentially have major quantifiable results for
other competitors that are lacking in noncompetitive settings.2 1 6
In holding that permitting Martin to ride would not provide
him with an advantage, the court relied heavily on the testimony
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Se generaly smnra notes 14-61 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA in
the employment context).
214
215
216
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of both Martin's physician and an expert on the physiological basis for fatigue.217 Martin's nutritional expert, in particular, testified that the energy expended in walking a golf course was
'
insignificant: "nutritionally ...less than a Big Mac."218

Relying on the medical opinion of experts as to the nature of
the accommodation required for a patient is fairly common in
ADA cases; 219 however, it is certainly questionable how much
weight should be given to an opinion on a question that is virtually incapable of precise determination.22 ° While it may be possible to quantify the amount of energy expended in walking, it
would seem scientifically impossible to assess with certainty
whether Casey Martin's fatigue level in riding is equal to or
greater than an able-bodied golfer's fatigue in walking. Even if
Martin's fatigue is only slightly less (admittedly, a doubtful proposition), it may be enough to give him an advantage.
These ramifications could be compounded as more individuals
seek waivers of the governing rules of a program. One of the
PGA's chief concerns in Martin was that allowing a waiver in
Martin's case would open the floodgates to future requests, some
valid, others concocted, to gain a competitive advantage. 221 As
the court in McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n

recognized, the task of making an individual determination for
each requestee as to the potential impact a waiver would have on
competition could pose a huge administrative burden.222
Given the severity of his disability, it was not overly difficult to
conclude that permitting Martin to ride a cart did not alter the
level playing field of PGA and Nike Tour events. It may turn
out, however, that the truly difficult case is not Martin, but a case
involving some future golfer with a disability not as severe as
Martin's. If the hypothetical court makes the unverifiable con217 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249-51.
218
See id. at 1250.
219 See, e.g., D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217,
223 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[I]n a case where there is no medical evidence to the contrary, and the treating physician's opinion does not appear on its face to be outrageous, it is appropriate for the Court to give great weight to the physician's opinions
220 See generally Pullin & Heaney, supra note 73, at 817 (noting the perhaps insurmountable constraints in establishing comparative tests for the disabled to effectively measure future college performance).
221 See Casey Martin's Ride, supra note 4.
222 See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 463 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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clusion that the hypothetical golfer would not be placed at an
advantage by a modification, and that decision is actually incorrect (if such a determination is even capable of assessment), then
the ADA will have worked a fundamental alteration on the nature of competitive golf.
The difficulty in making this type of determination is compounded when courts must confront a requested waiver of a leveling rule. Courts should be particularly cautious in granting
accommodations in such cases. These types of rules are designed
specifically to create a level playing field, and nearly any alteration, if not properly accounted for, would alter the level playing
field. As mentioned earlier, the no-cart rule in Martin was not
such a rule-its leveling effect was only incidental to the rule's
purpose.22 3 This fact made the court's decision to grant the
waiver in Martin's case somewhat easier. If, however, Martin
had requested a waiver of one of golf's leveling rules, the court
would have faced an extremely difficult task in assessing the effect the accommodation might have on competition. It is for this
reason that courts must tread with care when they enter inside
the ropes of competitive settings.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the clearest lesson to be learned from Casey Martin's
quest is that courts need to use extra care when dealing with the
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement outside the
traditional employment sphere. Within this sphere, questions as
to the fundamental fairness of requiring employers to accommodate the special needs of their employees are not as pressing.
When one leaves the sphere and enters more competitive settings-settings in which there are clearly defined winners and
losers and in which an artificial advantage for one participant
necessarily means a disadvantage for others-issues of fundamental fairness become more troubling.
Within a competitive setting, courts need to be particularly vigilant in order to prevent the disabled from gaining an unfair advantage of their able-bodied counterparts. By undertaking a
step-by-step analysis which focuses on purposes of the rule at issue, whether permitting an accommodation would thwart that
purpose, and never losing sight of the fact that, by its actions, it
223 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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may be creating an unlevel playing field, courts can attempt to
minimize the risks inherent in the reasonable accommodation requirement. If the reasonable accommodation requirement places
individual competitors at a disadvantage, the accommodation
ceases to be reasonable and the law ceases to be fair. Fair play is,
after all, the essence of competition.
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